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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Deborah S. Goosby, a Black female, brought this Title VII 
action against her former employer, Johnson & Johnson 
Medical Inc. ("JJMI"), alleging that certain adverse 
employment decisions were the result of illegal racial and 
gender bias. The district court granted JJMI's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed all of Goosby's claims. 
For the reasons that follow, we will reverse in part and 
affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 
JJMI initially hired Goosby as a Territory Assistant in 
Virginia in 1990, and she was subsequently transferred 
from Virginia to JJMI's Empire Division in New York. There, 
she worked as a Sales Representative and was later 
promoted to Senior Sales Representative. In January 1992, 
Ms. Goosby was transferred to the Three Rivers Division in 
Pennsylvania where she was working when she filed this 
suit. She was the only Black female in that division, and 
her direct supervisor there was the Division Manager, 
Martin Murray. Murray reported to the Regional Manager, 
Ron Evans. 
 
Goosby's responsibilities at Three Rivers consisted 
primarily of selling operating room related products to 
Western Pennsylvania area hospitals. In November 1994, 
JJMI restructured its sales force by creating three new 
positions: (1) Account Manager ("AM"); (2) Surgical 
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Specialist Representative ("SSR"); and (3) Continuing Care 
Representative ("CCR"), and assigning its sales 
representatives to one of those three new positions. The AM 
& SSR positions involved essentially the same hospital 
customers, and many of the same products, Goosby had 
been servicing before the reorganization. The CCR position, 
on the other hand, was geared toward the nursing home 
market -- which JJMI was attempting to enter for the first 
time -- and involved products Goosby was not familiar 
with. 
 
Goosby expressed interest in the SSR and AM positions 
because they involved selling the same products and 
utilizing the same sales contacts she was involved with 
before the reorganization. In addition, because JJMI was 
relatively new to the nursing home market, the CCR 
position required calling sales referrals she did not know. 
This "cold-calling" was far more difficult than calling 
established customers. Goosby alleges without 
contradiction that she had been so effective selling to her 
old customers that she had won several awards for 
exceptional sales including recognition for the highest sales 
volume, and induction into the company's "Ring Club" for 
outstanding sales performance. App. at 526. She also had 
the highest average commissions within her division and 
alleges that her customers had high regard for her. App. at 
503-16. 
 
Goosby believed that the AM and SSR positions were 
preferable to the CCR position because both appeared to 
provide greater opportunity sales and would therefore result 
in larger commissions and better promotions. She also 
based her belief in part upon a conversation with a JJMI 
representative who had told her that the AM position was 
for the "best of the best" and that AM positions had been 
assigned only to employees that the company believed in. 
App. at 441-444. Goosby alleges that the CCR position, on 
the other hand, was for employees that the company 
wanted to get rid of. 
 
JJMI developed a competency assessment tool (the 
"Matrix") to match employees with the new positions. 
According to JJMI, the District Managers evaluated each of 
his/her employees according to eight competencies and five 
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skill sets that the District Managers were given to use as 
evaluators.1 The Division Managers assigned each of 
his/her employees a score from "one" to "five" for each 
competency and skill set and sent the completed forms to 
the Regional Manager.2 The Regional Manager then applied 
various weights to the Matrix scores to reflect the different 
competencies required for each position. For example, 
according to JJMI, the most important qualifications for the 
CCR position were drive, selling process, relationship 
building, product knowledge and presentation skills while 
administrative and organizational skills were the primary 
attributes of an AM. Each employee was then given a 
separate score for each of the new positions based upon the 
weighted calculations of the Matrix. The lowest score for a 
particular position indicated which of the three positions 
the employee was most qualified for. However, JJMI 
concedes that each Division Manager also recommended 
placements for the employees he/she supervised when the 
Division Manager sent the Matrix to the Regional Manager. 
 
Goosby received poor scores in administrative, time 
management, and organizational skills but she received 
high scores in relationship building and presentation skills. 
App. at 199. Her scores for drive, product knowledge, 
business savvy, and pricing/contracts were satisfactory. Id. 
Based solely upon the weighted numerical ranking that 
resulted from those scores, the Matrix indicated that she 
was best suited for the CCR position; and Division 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The listed competencies were drive, selling process, relationship 
building, product knowledge, business savvy, analytical, administrative, 
and time management. The listed skill sets were computer skills, 
leadership, pricing and contracts, presentation skills, and organization 
skills. 
 
2. The numbers assigned to the skills were as follows: 
 
       1- outstanding; 2- consistently exceeds standards; 
       3- meeting standards in this area; 
       4- occasionally meets standards; 
       5- does not meet standards 
 
Thus, under this system, the position which yielded the lowest score 
after the weights were attached, was ostensibly the position for which 
the employee was most suited. 
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Manager, Martin Murray, recommended her for that 
position when he sent the completed Matrix to the Regional 
Manager. Id.; App. at 189. 
 
Goosby was subsequently assigned to the CCR position, 
but she was openly displeased. Five days after being 
informed of the assignment, she filed a charge of race and 
sex discrimination with the EEOC and the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission ("PHRC"). In the latter she 
alleged a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act. 43 P.S. S 955 ("PHRA").3  
 
Despite her displeasure with her assignment, Goosby 
began working as a CCR on January 1, 1995. However, in 
May 1995, she took a short-term disability leave. Under 
JJMI's disability policy, salaried employees were allowed to 
remain on short-term disability for a maximum of twenty- 
six weeks, but JJMI reserved the right to reassign afield 
sales employee's sales territory (Goosby's CCR position) 
after twelve weeks of disability leave. The policy also 
required the employee to "communicate any unexpected 
change in medical status to the medical department[of 
JJMI]." App. at 265. The employee could not return without 
submitting a "return-to-work authorization" form by which 
the treating physician confirmed the employee's ability to 
perform the full scope of his/her job. App. at 264-67. 
Goosby was medically cleared to return to work and did 
return on July 11, 1995. 
 
However, Goosby took a second disability leave on August 
14, 1995. On November 17, 1995, her treating physician 
again authorized her return to work, but only in a limited 
capacity. Accordingly, Evans and Murray compiled a list of 
possible reduced duty jobs that Goosby could perform 
consistent with her physician's authorization. App. at 145. 
However, JJMI never extended an offer for limited duty 
because Evans and Murray subsequently concluded that an 
employee could not discharge the responsibilities of a CCR 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The analysis required for adjudicating Goosby's claim under PHRA is 
identical to a Title VII inquiry. Jones v. School District of 
Philadelphia, 
198 F.3d 403, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999), and we therefore do not need to 
separately address her claim under the PHRA. 
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on a reduced duty basis. App. at 298. Accordingly, Goosby 
remained on disability leave. 
 
The second twenty-six week leave that Goosby was 
entitled to ended on February 14, 1996, under JJMI's 
policy; but Goosby had not yet been cleared to return to 
work on that date. Goosby now claims that the delay in 
returning resulted from JJMI's failure to send the necessary 
authorization forms for her doctor's approval. However, 
JJMI argues that specific forms are not necessary. 
According to JJMI, Goosby only had to obtain a letter from 
her treating physician stating that he/she unconditionally 
cleared Goosby to return to work full time. App. at 272, 
276-77. 
 
On March 6, 1996, Goosby learned that JJMI had 
permanently reassigned her territory to another sales 
representative. Six days later, she did finally submit an 
unrestricted medical clearance from her treating physician. 
The authorization stated that Goosby had been capable of 
returning to work as early as February 14, 1996. App. at 
322. However, JJMI had already filled Goosby's CCR 
position, and it was therefore not available. JJMI did, 
however, offer Goosby a CCR position in Buffalo, New York. 
JJMI claims that was the only CCR position available at the 
time. App. at 323-7. Goosby failed to respond to the offer, 
and JJMI thereafter terminated her employment. 
 
On January 14, 1998, Goosby filed the instant action in 
the district court alleging race and gender discrimination in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1981 ("Title VII"), and the PHRA. 
She alleges that the discrimination consists of her 
assignment to the CCR position, JJMI's refusal to allow her 
to work in a restricted duty capacity, and the reassignment 
of her territory while she was on disability leave. Goosby 
also claims that JJMI illegally retaliated against her for the 
first charge of discrimination that she had filed with the 
EEOC.4 Following discovery, the district court accepted the 
magistrate judge's report and recommendation, and granted 
JJMI's motion for summary judgment on all of Goosby's 
claims. This appeal followed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The EEOC had investigated and found her original charges were 
meritorious. 
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II. 
 
Our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo. 
See Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299, 1304 (3d Cir. 1987). 
Summary judgement is appropriate "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 
III. 
 
Title VII and the PHRA both prohibit an employer from 
engaging in race or gender discrimination against an 
employee. Under the oft cited decision in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Goosby mustfirst 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To do so she 
must offer sufficient evidence that she was: (1) a member of 
the protected class, (2) qualified for the position she sought, 
and (3) nonmembers of the protected class were treated 
more favorably. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis- 
Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 522 (3d Cir. 1993). Once a plaintiff 
under Title VII establishes a prima facie case, the employer 
must come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment decision. See Texas 
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254- 
56 (1981). If the employer is able to proffer a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the proffered reason was merely a pretext 
for unlawful discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Products Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000). 
 
IV. 
 
The district court concluded that Goosby had established 
a prima facie case, and we agree. She can obviously satisfy 
the first prong of the inquiry as a Black female. Secondly, 
the AM and SSR positions involved the products and 
customers she had dealt with prior to the restructuring. 
She had not only performed those duties well, she had 
excelled. As noted above, she earned the highest average 
sales commissions within her division, and her sales ability 
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won her national recognition. We therefore conclude that 
Goosby has established her qualifications for the two 
positions she sought. 
 
However, before we address JJMI's explanation for its 
employment decisions, we must address a dispute about 
whether JJMI's decision to award Goosby the CCR position 
really was an "adverse employment decision." JJMI argues 
that each of the three positions it created during the 
reorganization had equivalent compensation and the 
opportunity for advancement and promotions was the 
same. However, as noted above, Goosby testified in her 
deposition that the CCR position was the least desirable 
because it operated in a new market, and the AM and SSR 
positions dealt with established customers. Therefore, she 
contends, it would be much harder for her to achieve the 
same level of sales in her new CCR position despite JJMI's 
assurances that the three positions were equal. Goosby also 
testified that AMs were viewed by the company as the best 
employees and placement in that position improved an 
employee's chances of promotion and recognition. JJMI 
disputes this by arguing that it would not go to the expense 
and effort necessary to successfully compete in the new 
market the CCR position was aimed at and then assign 
employees it didn't intend to keep to develop the new area 
of sales. 
 
The divergence of Goosby's view of the CCR position and 
her employer's rejoinder obviously creates a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether Goosby was treated 
adversely. Inasmuch as we are reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, we must accept Goosby's assertion 
that the CCR position was less desirable than the other 
two. Accordingly, we must examine JJMI's explanation for 
awarding Goosby the CCR position. See Jones v. School 
Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). JJMI 
justifies Goosby's assignment to the CCR by arguing that it 
was dictated by the objective scoring of the Matrix that 
Evans, not Murray completed. According to JJMI, Goosby's 
assignment was determined by her poor administrative 
skills score. JJMI points out that those low scores were 
consistent with, and confirmed by, several performance 
evaluations wherein Goosby's administrative and 
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organizational skills had been evaluated as needing 
improvement. App. at 205, 213, 221, 223, 231, 238, 241, 
257. JJMI asserts that those were the skills that were most 
important to the positions Goosby preferred.5 
 
JJMI argues that Murray did not even know how the 
"objective" rating he gave Goosby would be weighed when 
he completed the Matrix. Moreover, Goosby concedes that 
her Matrix score is consistent with her assignment to the 
CCR position given JJMI's scoring system, and that she 
does have the administrative weaknesses that JJMI claims 
lead to her assignment as a CCR. However, Goosby argues 
that JJMI's stated reliance on the Matrix was itself merely 
a pretext to camouflage the subjective decision of 
Division Manager, Martin Murray, and that Murray's 
recommendation actually caused her placement. She claims 
that Murray ran a "good old boys" network that has 
adversely effected her since she began working in the Three 
Rivers Division. She suggests that this is reflected in the 
fact that her pay increases were "drastically reduced" by 
Murray, see App. 423-4, despite her stellar sales, and in 
Murray's practice of inviting the White males in the division 
to play golf, as well as the discriminatory manner in which 
Murray handled complaints against various employees in 
his division. 
 
Goosby insists that her assignment as a CCR reflects 
Murray's bias rather than her Matrix score, and she points 
to situations where the Matrix score supported one 
assignment, but Murray contemporaneously recommended 
another. In the instances she refers to, the ultimate 
assignment was consistent with Murray's recommendation; 
not the purportedly objective scoring of the Matrix. For 
example, according to the Matrix score, employee Naetzker 
should have been assigned to an SSR or CCR position. App. 
at 197. However, Murray recommended Naetzker to be 
placed into an AM position, and Murray's recommendation 
was honored. Similarly, the Matrix scoring indicated that 
employees Kennedy and Deluca should become CCRs. App. 
at 198, 200. However, Murray recommended that both 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. JJMI maintains that employees' preferences were irrelevant as they 
weren't considered in making the placements. 
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employees be awarded positions as AMs, and his 
recommendations were once again honored. 
 
Goosby also argues that other employees with poor 
scores for administrative and organizational ability were 
nevertheless awarded the "preferable" positions purportedly 
denied her because of those weaknesses. That allegation, if 
proven, would support a finding of discrimination despite 
her administrative weaknesses. JJMI attempts to explain 
this discrepancy by pointing out that only a limited number 
of employees were needed to fill each position and therefore 
the Matrix could not always be followed. That may well be, 
however, a reasonable fact finder could also conclude that 
the Matrix did not have the importance JJMI claims, and 
that JJMI's reliance on it to explain Goosby's placement is 
merely a pretext to cover Murray's discriminatory motive in 
not recommending her for the "better" positions. See Meritor 
Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 (1986) ("An 
employer can act only through individual supervisors. . . 
discrimination is rarely carried out pursuant to a formal 
vote of a corporation's board of directors."). Moreover, the 
Matrix criteria and their weighting are themselves highly 
subjective even though they are given an apparently 
objective numerical ranking. Accordingly, the Matrix does 
not insulate JJMI to the extent that JJMI suggests. 
"[S]ubjective evaluations are more susceptible of abuse and 
more likely to mask pretext." See Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 
F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1990)(citations and internal 
quotations omitted). 
 
       We have held that while objective job qualifications 
       should be considered in evaluating a plaintiff 's prima 
       facie case, the question of whether an employee 
       possesses a subjective quality, such as leadership or 
       management skill, is better left to the later stage of the 
       McDonnel Douglas analysis. 
 
Id. 
 
Moreover, "subjective" scoring is sometimes based upon 
factors that are too speculative to base a meaningful 
comparison. Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 
132 F.3d 635, 644 (11th Cir. 1998). In Carter , the court 
held that an employer's reliance on plaintiff 's lack of 
 
                                10 
  
"special knowledge and skills" was "too subjective to allow 
for any meaningful comparison between [two applicants]." 
Id. at 644. The court noted that other requirements such as 
"initiative and judgment capabilities" and the ability "to 
relate to people in a manner to win confidence and 
establish support" can not be evaluated objectively and 
therefore should not be relied upon to overcome a prima 
facie case of discrimination. Id. 
 
Of course, a plaintiff can not ultimately prove 
discrimination merely because his/her employer relied 
upon highly subjective qualities (i.e. "drive" or 
"enthusiasm") in making an employment decision. However, 
just as use of such criteria does not establish 
discrimination, cloaking such criteria with an appearance 
of objectivity does not immunize an employment decision 
from a claim of discrimination. 
 
       Although courts must be careful not to second-guess 
       an employer's business judgment that it makes in good 
       faith, plaintiff must be allowed to show that her 
       employer's asserted reasons for discharging her were a 
       pretext and that the real reason was [illegal 
       discrimination]. 
 
Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, 22 F.3d 1219, 1226 
(2nd Cir. 1994) (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 
U.S. 502, 519 (1993). 
 
JJMI also argues that Goosby's claim of gender 
discrimination should be dismissed because the only other 
woman in her division was assigned to a position as an AM. 
However, that does not necessarily defeat Goosby's claim of 
gender bias. Clearly, an employer does not have to 
discriminate against all members of a class to illegally 
discriminate against a given member of that class. See 
Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, 191 F. 3d 344, 353-4 (3rd 
Cir. 1999) ("even if a woman is fired and replaced by 
another woman, she may have been treated differently from 
similarly situated male employees."). Within the atmosphere 
of the "old boys' network" that Goosby alleges, it is certainly 
possible that some females may have been preferred 
because they were more "like one of the boys" than Goosby. 
Id. at 354 ("an employer may fire women who fail to act in 
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a particular manner" or who appear more assertive and 
"less feminine"). In addition, it is conceivable that an 
employer who harbors a discriminatory animus may 
nevertheless allow one or two females to advance for the 
sake of appearances. 
 
Moreover, evidence that JJMI afforded a White female an 
assignment that it denied to a Black female hardly defeats 
a claim of race/gender discrimination brought by a Black 
female. 
 
We are, of course, reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, and we do not suggest that JJMI is guilty of race 
and/or gender discrimination, or that Goosby will 
ultimately be able to prove the discrimination she is 
alleging. Goosby admits to having problems with 
administrative tasks, and JJMI argues that the positions 
she sought placed a premium on the very areas where 
Goosby admits to being weakest. However, Goosby's claim 
that she was treated less favorably than White males with 
similar weaknesses can not be decided as a matter of law. 
In an employment discrimination case "a trial court must 
be cautious about granting summary judgment to an 
employer when, as here, its intent is at issue." Gallo v. 
Prudential Residential Services, Ltd. Partnership , 22 F.3d 
1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). Inasmuch as there are genuine 
issues of material fact as to JJMI's motives in assigning 
Goosby to the CCR position, we hold that the district court 
erred in granting JJMI summary judgment on that portion 
of Goosby's claim. Accordingly, the court's dismissal of 
Goosby's Title VII and PHRA claims based upon JJMI's 
failure to place her in the AM or SSR position will be 
reversed. 
 
V. 
 
Goosby also alleges that JJMI discriminated against her 
by not allowing her to return to work in a limited duty 
capacity. As noted above, JJMI explained that it"did not 
have a restricted duty policy for any field sales employees" 
because "a sales employee [such as Goosby] could not 
perform all the essential tasks, such as makingfield visits 
to existing and potential customers, if they were on 
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restricted duty." App. at 49. When Goosby's physician first 
released her for restricted duty, her supervisors began 
discussing possible options. On October 16, 1995, Evans e- 
mailed Murray with a list of reduced activities which JJMI 
would have Goosby perform if they "decide[d] to recommend 
a reduced activity assignment." App. 486. A few days later, 
Evans sent a memo to Pat Van Wye, JJMI's leave 
coordinator, stating "I am of the opinion we should 
aggressively move forward and . . . potentially establish a 
reduced duty assignment." App. at 488. He attached the list 
of potential reduced duty activities to that memo. However, 
before any firm offer was made, Evans and Murray decided 
to only allow the return of a field sales representative such 
as Goosby if the representative was capable of performing 
his/her full duties. There is no evidence that any other 
JJMI sales representative was ever allowed to work in a 
limited capacity, and Goosby has not produced any 
evidence that JJMI's explanation for its refusal to offer her 
such a position was pretextual. Therefore, the district court 
did not err in dismissing this portion of Goosby's claim. 
 
VI. 
 
Ms. Goosby also claims that JJMI discriminated against 
her by permanently filling her position while she was on 
leave. However, as noted above, JJMI's short term disability 
policy provided for a maximum of twenty-six weeks 
disability leave and guaranteed only that a field sales 
employee's territory would remain open for the first twelve 
weeks of that leave. App. 264-66. Moreover, before 
returning to work, an employee on leave was clearly 
required to submit a medical release from a treating 
physician. 
 
It is undisputed that Goosby's twenty-six weeks of leave 
expired on February 14, 1996 and that she did not submit 
her doctor's authorization until after that date. She argues 
that the authorization was delayed because JJMI did not 
send her the paperwork for completion until February 6, 
1996. We find that excuse unavailing. JJMI asserts that it 
would have accepted a letter from her treating physician, 
and had done so in the past, so that Goosby knew that she 
did not have to wait for specific forms to obtain her 
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physician's authorization to return to work. However, even 
if that claim is not accurate, Goosby clearly knew the clock 
was ticking and she had sufficient time between the forms 
being sent and the expiration of her leave period to return 
the forms to JJMI. She failed to do so. Absent any evidence 
that she was unable to comply with JJMI's policy because 
of something JJMI did, we are not persuaded that there is 
a genuine issue of material fact as to this issue. 
 
Goosby argues that, although the short term disability 
policy did exist, JJMI did not uniformly follow it. A violation 
of company policy can constitute a pretext for unlawful 
discrimination if others similarly situated also violated the 
policy with no adverse consequence. See Delli Santi v. CNA 
Ins. Companies, 88 F.3d 192, 203-4 (3d Cir.1996). Goosby 
points to two White female employees who returned to work 
in their original positions after being on leave for more than 
twenty-six weeks. Appellant's Brief at 27. However, even 
assuming that is true, Goosby has not demonstrated that 
either of those employees was similarly situated to her. 
Goosby can not establish the type of leave those women 
took or whether their paperwork was submitted on time. 
Thus, Goosby can not overcome JJMI's reliance on its 
established policy, and the district court properly concluded 
that JJMI was entitled to summary judgment on the 
portion of Goosby's claim that arose from her termination 
following her disability leave. 
 
VII. 
 
Finally, Goosby claims that JJMI unlawfully retaliated 
against her for filing a charge of discrimination. To 
establish a prima facie claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must 
show that he/she is engaged in protected activity, that the 
employer took an adverse employment action against 
him/her, and that there is a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action. See 
Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 
1997). Goosby filed the relevant charges with the EEOC on 
November 28, 1994 and claims that JJMI retaliated by not 
allowing her to return to work in a restricted duty capacity 
and by reassigning her territory before her return. 
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The district court disposed of that claim as follows: 
 
       plaintiff 's argument . . . does not provide a jury with 
       sufficient evidence from which an inference of 
       retaliation can be made. Plaintiff does not, and cannot, 
       contest that her position was held open to her for a full 
       26 weeks of disability leave. . . Further, plaintiff 
       concedes that defendant requested from her, prior to 
       the expiration of her sick leave, a return to work 
       authorization, and that she did not provide such an 
       authorization until almost a month after her sick leave 
       expired. No inference of retaliation can be rationally 
       drawn from these facts. 
 
App. at 603-4. 
 
We agree. In addition, the time frame between Goosby's 
EEOC filing and the alleged retaliation weighs against the 
causation that she must establish. There was nearly a full 
year between the first filing with the EEOC and Goosby's 
attempts to return to work on restricted duty, and almost 
fifteen months passed before she was permanently replaced 
and ultimately terminated. Although such a lapse may not 
prevent a plaintiff from establishing the required nexus in 
every case, given the circumstances here Goosby can not 
establish that a genuine dispute as to the material fact of 
causation. There is nothing to suggest any link between the 
EEOC filing and the adverse job action that followed. 
 
VIII. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's dismissal of 
Goosby's claim of discrimination based on her assignment 
to a CCR position is reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The district 
court's grant of summary judgment to JJMI is affirmed in 
all other respects. 
 
A True Copy: 
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